

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 ACCRA 2630

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: AMGT, EGEN, PFOR, GH  
SUBJ: PARM-ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I

REF: CERP 0001

### PART I - POLICY ASSESSMENT

#### A. US INTERESTS IN GHANA:

- POLITICAL STABILITY AND MODERATE ECONOMIC AND DOMESTIC POLICIES.
- SUPPORT FOR AMERICAN POSITIONS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES.
- MAINTAINING GOOD CONTACTS WITH GHANA'S ARMED FORCES.
- PROTECTING US INVESTMENTS AND ENCOURAGING TRADE RELATIONS.
- HELPING THE POOR MAJORITY BY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.
- STRENGTHENING RELATIONS THROUGH EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES.

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#### B. OVERVIEW

1. LIKE SEVERAL OTHER WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES, GHANA HAS HISTORY OF INSTABILITY AND CONSTANTLY FLIRTS WITH ECONOMIC COLLAPSE. SINCE INDEPENDENCE IN 1957, IT HAS EXPERIMENTED WITH SEVERAL FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, EACH TIME WITH UNHAPPY RESULTS. SEVERE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, NOTABLY-HIGH LEVELS OF INEFFICIENCY, SEVERE SHORTAGE

OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE, CONTINUED RELIANCE ON COCOA FOR MOST FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS, RAMPANT INFLATION AND CURRUPTION, AND AN UNSHAKEABLE PROPENSITY TO IMPORT-- STILL PLAGUE GHANA AND ARE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO PERSIST OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS. A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IS HIGHLY PROBABLE OVER THE NEXT ONE TO TWO YEARS, BUT SINCE A NEW GOVERNMENT WILL FACE THE SAME INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS AND IS LIKELY TO LOOK MUCH LIKE ITS PREDECESSOR,, SUCH A CHANGE SHOULD NOT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE TO THE U.S.

2. WE BELIEVE THE UNINSPIRED AND CORRUPT ACHEAMPONG REGIME IS LIVING ON BORROWED TIME AND COULD WELL BE REPLACED BY A NEW REGIME IN WHICH THE MILITARY EXERCISES CONTROL BUT WHICH MAY HAVE A HIGHER DEGREE OF CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION. BECAUSE OF THE BASICALLY WESTERN ORIENTATION OF MOST EDUCATED GHANAIANS (AND INDEED, OF MOST ORDINARY CITIZENS), A NEW GOVERNMENT FORMED ALONG THESE LINES WILL PROBABLY BE REASONABLY MODERATE IN ITS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES. BECAUSE INEFFICIENCY AND CORRUPTION ARE TWO OF THE MOST VISIBLE STUMBLING-BLOCKS IN RUNNING THE COUNTRY, A NEW REGIME WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY CALL FOR HARD WORK, HONESTY AND INTEGRITY ALL AROUND. WHETHER THESE WILL BE FORTHCOMING, OR WHETHER THE NEW LEADERS THEMSELVES WILL BE ABLE TO HOLD OUT AGAINST TEMPTATION, ARE OPEN QUESTIONS. IN FACT, CORRUPTION HAS NO CHANGE OF BEING ROOTED OUT OF GHANAIAN SOCIETY UNLESS ANY NEW LEADERSHIP PROVIDES A BELIEVABLE-- AND QUITE NOVEL-EXAMPLE. IN ANY CASE, BECAUSE NATIONALIZED FOR STATE-CONTROLLED ENTERPRISES  
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HERE ARE NOTORIOUS UNDER-ACHIEVERS, A POST-ACHEAMPONG GOVERNMENT IS NOT LIKELY TO MOVE GHANA CLOSER TO A SOCIALIST MODEL. AT THE SAME TIME, BECAUSE IT WILL BE SENSITIVE TO CHARGES OF BEING TOO PRO-WEST, IT IS EQUALLY UNLIKELY TO ENCOURAGE LAISSEZ-FAIRE CAPITALISM.

3. THERE IS A DEEP RESERVOIR HERE OF GOOD-WILL TOWARDS AMERICANS AND THE WEST. OUR OFFICIALS AND VISITORS ARE WELL- RECEIVED AND POPULAR. A CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT WILL, IN OUR VIEW, STEM FROM ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES RATHER THAN FROM AN IDEOLOGICAL SHIFT. AS THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF THE AVERAGE GHANAIAN DECREASES, WE ARE CERTAIN TO BE ASKED FOR ADDITIONAL AID. IF GHANA EXHAUSTS ITS FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES AND CREDIT STANDING, OR IF HUNGER PERSISTS IN THE NORTH, WE WILL BE ASKED TO PROVIDE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF ASSISTANCE ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS BEYOND THOSE ALREADY SOUGHT. WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY ENCOURAGING OTHER DONORS TO CONTRIBUTE, WE SHOULD BE AS RESPONSIVE AS WE CAN TO FOOD AND OTHER EMERGENCY

REQUEST AND SHOULD ASSIST IN LONGER TERM DEVELOPMENT TO THE EXTENT OUR RESOURCES PERMIT AND TO THE EXTENT GHANAIANS ARE PREPARED TO DO THEIR OWN BIT TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS HERE.

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4. SOVIET INFLUENCE HERE HAS REBOUNDED SOMEWHAT FROM THE NADIR IT REACHED AFTER THE FALL OF NKRUMAH IN 1966. SOME USSR AID PROJECTS FROM THE NKRUMAH ERA ARE BEING RECLAIMED FROM THE BUSH, AND THE SOVIET EMBASSY IS FAIRLY ACTIVE IN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES, IN CONTACTS WITH THE PRESS, AND WITH THE GOG AND THE PUBLIC, ESPECIALLY YOUTH. HOWEVER, LANGUAGE AND CLUTURE HINDER SOVIET SUCCESSES, AS DOES A SUSPICION THAT THEIR OFFICIALS ARE NOT FREE FROM RACISM. MOREOVER, SOVIET SECRETIVENESS AND DOURNESS SHARPLY CONTRAST WITH GHANA'S TRADITIONS OF RELATIVE OPENNESS AND GOOD CHEER. SO, DESPITE RHETORIZAL ASIDES WHICH SEEM TO FAVOR THE SOCIALIST CAMP, GHANA'S INSTINCTIVE ORIENTATION WILL CONTINUE TO BE TOWARDS THE WEST.

5. THE CHINESE ARE MUCH LESS VISIBLE THAN THE SOVIETS AND DO NOT APPEAR TO BE MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT IN GHANA. THEIR AID EFFORTS, CONCENTRATED ON AGRICULTURE, ARE WELL-RECEIVED BUT LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL BARRIERS LIMIT CHINESE IMPACT. WE DOUBT PRC INFLUENCE WILL RISE SIMGNFICANTLY OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS.

6. ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES, GHANA WILL CONTINUE ITS STRONG COMMITMENT OF MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN  
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AFRICA, THE TOUCHSTONE BY WHICH THE GOG WILL JUDGE US. MOREOVER, GHANA STILL SEES ITSELF AS THE BIRTH-PLACE OF THE AFRICAN LIBERATION STRUGGLE AND THE INHERITOR OF THE NKRUMAH MANTLE. RETAINING ITS CREDENTIALS IN THIS AREA IS A MATTER OF NATIONAL PRIDE. OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS GHANA WILL THEREFORE TRY TO STAY AT LEAST ON THE FRINGES OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, RECEIVING FRONT-LINE HEADS OF STATE AND LIBERATION CAPTAINS WHO TRANSIT WEST AFRICA. TO THE EXTENT OUR POLICY IS SEEN AS BEING SERIOUSLY DIRECTED TO CHANGING THE STATUS QUO IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, GHANA WILL SUPPORT US. HOWEVER, LUKEWARM OR UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS ON OUR PART WILL ALIENATE US FROM GHANA ON THESE ISSUES.

7. REMEMBERING ITS GOLDEN AGE AS A LEADER OF THE THIRD WORLD, GHANA WILL TEND TO GO ALONG WITH THIRD WORLD POSITIONS ON KOREA AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. IT WILL CONTINUE TO WADE CONFIDENTLY INTO ISSUES WHICH IT DOES NOT UNDERSTAND OR, PERHAPS, WANT TO UNDERSTAND. WE WILL NOT TIRE OF BRINGING THE FACTS TO THE GOG'S ATTENTION, BUT HERE THE PAST IS PROLOGUE--WE CANNOT ASSUME SUCCESS. THEREFORE, WE MUST ACCEPT THE PROBABILITY THAT, WHETHER UNDER ACHEAMPONG OR ANOTHER REGIME, GHANA WILL OPPOSE US ON SOME OF THE MULTILATERAL ISSUES WE DEEM AS IMPORTANT. IN OUR VIEW, OUR BEST COURSE OF ACTION IS TO KEEP DEMARCHES SIMPLE AND LOW-KEY, RECOGNIZING THAT WHEN GHANA OPPOSES US, IT IS DOING SO NOT SO MUCH ON THE MERITS OF THE ISSUE AS ON ITS PERCEIVED NEED TO SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH THIRD WORLD COUSINS.

8. LOOKING AHEAD OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS, I AM NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THIS COUNTRY'S PROSPECTS DESPITE ITS CONSIDERABLE NATURAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES. ITS IMMENSELY LIKEABLE PEOPLE ARE CHEERFUL, RESILIENT

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AND PATIENT, BUT DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF A WELL-QUALIFIED ELITE, THE POPULACE AS A WHOLE IS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH EVEN PRIMITIVE TECHNOLOGY. PERHAPS MORE TELLING IS THE HISTORICAL OBSERVATION THAT IN GHANA, POWER HAS BEEN SYNONYMOUS WITH ITS ABUSE. CERTAINLY EVERY GOVERNMENT SINCE INDEPENDENCE HAS Mired ITSELF IN THE TAR PITS OF CORRUPTION AND IT IS DIFFICULT

TO SEE HOW THIS TENDENCY WIL CHANGE SOON.

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9. SHORT OF THE EMERGENCE OF A STRONG, REALISTIC  
AND PRAGMATIC GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE  
YEARS AHEAD WILL CONTINUE TO BE ERRATIC AND WLL NOT  
IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY. EXPECTATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO  
OUTRUN RESOURCES. WHAT RESOURCES THERE ARE WILL NOT

BE WISELY ALLOCATED. FOREIGN TRADE WILL REMAIN A KEY  
FACTOR, GUT EXPORT EARNINGS WILL CONTINUE TO FLUCTUATE  
WILDLY. DETERMINANTS OF THESE SWINGS WILL INCLUDE THE  
VOLATILE NATURE OF COCOA PRICES, DECLINGING COCOA PRO-  
DUCTION, AND THE FACT THAT MOST OTHER GHANAIAIAN EXPORTS  
ARE ALSO COMMODITIES WITH WIDE PRICE SWINGS.THE  
INDUSTRIAL BASE WILL NOT EXPAND SIGNIFICANTLY. GOOD  
SUFFICIENCY WILL REMAIN A PROBLEM.

10. NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE THIS PESSIMISTIC READING,  
I DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD CUT GHANA ADRIFT AND LET IT  
FEND FOR ITSELF. US ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND THE BASIC-  
ALLY MODERATE AND PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION OF GHANAIAANS  
MAKE OUR INVOLVEMENT WORTH PURSUING. HOW THIS SHOULD  
BE DONE, IN OUR VIEW, IS DISCUSSED BELOW.

C. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION AND ISSUES

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(1) OBJECTIVES

(A) SEEKING A MODERATE GOG COURSE IN DOMESTIC AND AFRICAN POLITICS AND GOG SUPPORT FOR US POSITION ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES, ESPECIALLY PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE.

(B) CONTRIBUTING TO GHANA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH AID AND PEACE CORPS PROJECTS, PARTICULARLY IN AGRICULTURE, HEALTH, POPULATION PROGRAMS AND EDUCATION.

(C) PROVIDING MILITARY TRAINING TO SELECTED OFFICERS, THEREBY MAINTAINING GOOD CONTACTS WITH THE ARMED FORCES.

(C) PROTECTING THE SIGNIFICANT US INVESTMENT, ASSURING CONTINUED SOURCES OF SUPPLY, PRESERVING AND EXPANDING THE RIGHTS OF US CARRIERS, AND (TO THE EXTENT ECONOMIC REALITIES PERMIT) ENCOURAGING INVESTMENT, TRADE AND TOURISM.

(E) CONTINUING PROGRAMS FOR CULTURAL COOPERATION AND EXCHANGE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

(2) COURSES OF ACTION

OUR COMMENTS ARE KEYED TO THE OBJECTIVES LISTED ABOVE.

(A) DOMESTIC ISSUES: WHILE THE US IS ADMIRABLE AS THE WORLD'S MOST DEVELOPED COUNTRY, OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE DOMESTIC POLITICS OR ECONOMIC DECISIONS HERE IS AND WILL REMAIN EXTREMELY LIMITED.

ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES, TO GHANA THE ISSUE TO SOUTHERN AFRICA IS QUITE STRAIGHTFORWARD: THE OBJECTIVE IS A SPEEDY TRANSFER TO BLACK MAJORITY RULE, INITIALLY IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA BUT EVENTUALLY IN SOUTH AFRICA AS WELL. GOG SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITIONS  
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ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER IT THINKS WE ARE SERIOUSLY PURSUING THIS OBJECTIVE OR MERELY PAYING LIP SERVICE TO IT. REPEAL OF THE BYRD AMENDMENT WAS WARMLY APPLAUDED HERE AND IS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF POSITIVE ACTION WHICH PAYS GOOD DIVIDENDS BOTH IN ACCRA AND IN OTHER BLACK AFRICAN CAPITALS. ON THE OTHER HAND, GENERALIZED USG STATEMENTS, HOWEVER SYMPATHETIC TO THE IDEA OF MAJORITY RULE, CAN NEVER TAKE THE PLACE OF ACTION, PARTICULARLY IF THEY ARE SEEN AS MANEUVERS DESIGNED TO AVOID THE

NEED FOR ACTION. FOR THIS REASON, AMERICAN STATEMENTS  
IN THE UN AND ELSEWHERE ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES HAVE  
DUTIFULLY BEEN BROUGHT TO THE GOG'S ATTENTION BUT HAVE  
HAD LITTLE IMPACT IN THE PAST. GHANA NOW EXPECTS MUCH  
MORE FROM THE NEW ADMINISTRATION.

ON NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES, GHANA WILL DRIFT WITH  
THIRD WORLD AND ESPECIALLY WITH OAU TIDES. RECENT  
AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO REEXAMINE COMMUNITY POLICY  
AND NOT TO REJECT A COMMON FUND OUT OF HAND IS SEEN  
BY THE GOG AS MOVING CLOSER TO ITS POSITION ON THIS  
KEY ISSUE. LIKE MOST LDC'S, GHANA CONCLUDES THE  
PRESENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS STACKED IN  
FAVOR OF THE DC'S. IT FEELS DC'S THEREFORE OWE IT  
AND OTHER LDC'S A SIGNIFICANT TRANSFER OF RESOURCES  
AS REPARATIONS FOR PAST INJUSTICES. HOWEVER, THE  
GOG IS USUALLY WILLING TO CONSIDER ECONOMIC  
ISSUES ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS WHEN THE NEED ARISES.  
WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE GOG, SEEKING  
ITS SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITIONS ON NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES,  
BUT GHANA WILL PROBABLY FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO GET  
AHEAD OF ITS THIRD WORLD COLLEAGUES.

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(B) ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT -- AID AND PEACE CORPS:  
IT IS UNLIKELY THAT GHANA CAN MOBILIZE ITS OWN RE-  
SOURCES IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE TO BECOME SELF-  
SUFFICIENT OR TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE POOR MAJORITY.  
BY TARGETING US FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE  
ON RELEVANT PARTS OF THE FIVE YEAR PLAN, HOWEVER, WE  
MAY BE ABLE TO HELP REDUCE THE IMPACT ON THE POOR

MAJORITY OF THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DETERIORATION. OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS AID WILL CONTINUE DEVELOPING A \$4 - \$4.5 MILLION TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION PROGRAM TARGETED ON FOOD, NUTRITION, HEALTH AND POPULATION. WE WANT TO CONTINUE THE PL 480 TITLE II MCH ASSISTANCE BUT AT AN INCREASED LEVEL. WE ALSO WANT TO EXPLORE WITH GG OFFICIALS A POSSIBLE PL 480 SECTION 206 PROGRAM. THIS WOULD BE BACKED UP BY A LOAN PROGRAM OF ABOUT \$10 MILLION EACH YEAR IN FOOD, NUTRITION AND RELATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT FIELDS. HOPEFULLY, THIS WOULD HELP EASE GHANA'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONSTRAINT AS WELL AS DIRECTLY BENEFIT THE POOR MAJORITY.

THE PEACE CORPS IN GHANA WILL CONTINUE TO PROGRAM CHIEFLY IN THE EDUCATIONAL SECTOR. AT PRESENT, ONLY THE MINISTRIES OF EDUCATION AND OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND

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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT HAVE THE PHYSICAL RESOURCES TO PERMIT VOLUNTEERS TO DO THEIR JOB. THEREFORE, WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, ALL OTHER PROGRAMMING MUST BE DONE THROUGH THE SUPPORT OF AID, THE WORLD BANK, UNDP OR OTHER THIRD PARTIES.

(C) MILITARY TRAINING: WE BELIEVE ONE OF THE BEST WAYS OF MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE MILITARY HERE IS THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION PROGRAM. SINCE THIS PROGRAM BEGAN IN GHANA IN 1962, OVER 270 OFFICERS (INCLUDING HEAD OF STATE ACHEAMPONG) HAVE ATTENDED US SERVICE SCHOOLS. ABOUT 50 MORE WILL HAVE GRADUATED BY THE END OF FY 1978. MOST HAVE BEEN FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM. OUR MODEST INVESTMENT PROVIDES US WITH MANY USEFUL MILITARY CONTACTS, WHO WOULD BE INACCESSIBLE WERE IT NOT FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE PROGRAM. SINCE THE MILITARY WILL CLEARLY CONTINUE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT DIRECT OR INDIRECT ROLE IN GHANA'S POLITICAL LIFE, THE ADVANTAGES OF CONTINUING THE PROGRAM ON A MODEST SCALE ARE OBVIOUS.

(D) ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL: THE MAJOR US INVESTMENT (THE \$200 MILLION - PLUS VALCO ALUMINUM SMELTER) IS NOT THREATENED BY EXPROPRIATION OR BY SERIOUS INTERFERENCE. OTHER US FIRMS WITH LESSER INTERESTS IN GHANA HAVE, IN COMMON WITH MOST EXPATRIATE FIRMS, SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES REMITTING FUNDS ABROAD. GHANAIANS CONSIDER OUR FAILURE TO BECOME PARTY TO THE INTERNATIONAL COCOA AGREEMENT AS AN IMPORTANT IRRITANT IN OUR RELATIONS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE OUR POSITION



KNOWN ON THIS ISSUE BUT IT IS LIKELY TO REMAIN OUT-  
STANDING FOR SOME TIME TO COME. THE CIVIL AVIATION  
AGREEMENT, INITIALED AND REFERENDUM IN LATE 1975, IS  
STILL PENDING; THE BALL HAS BEEN IN THE GOG COURT OVER  
TWO OR THREE SMALL MATTERS AND WE HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR  
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GOG CLARIFICATION SINCE THE AUTUMN OF 1976. ENCOURAGING  
NEW AMERICAN INVESTMENT, TRADE AND TOURISM HAS BEEN  
HARD SLEDDING; ANY MAJOR SUCCESS IN THESE FIELDS MUST  
AWAIT FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN GOG POLICIES.

(E) INFORMATION/CULTURAL EXCHANGE: USIS PROGRAMS  
IN GHANA TRY TO MAINTAIN THE EXISTING CLIMATE OF UNDER-  
STANDING AND GOOD WILL TO SUPPORT US INTERESTS AND HELP  
ASSURE A WELCOME FOR US OFFICIALS, CITIZENS AND  
BUSINESSMEN. OUR PROGRAM AIM TO: IMPROVE UNDER-  
STANDING OF CURRENT AMERICAN POLICY; BUILD AWARENESS  
OF AMERICAN SUPPORT IN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND DEVELOP-  
MENT ASSISTANCE; PORTRAY ASPECTS OF OUR EXPERIENCE  
AND SOCIETY WHICH ARE RELEVANT TO GHANA;  
AND SUPPORT ON-GOING CULTURAL AND SCHOLARLY EXCHANGES.  
WE ARE STRESSING EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES,  
LECTURES, SEMINARS, FILMS, LIBRARIES, PUBLICATIONS AND  
MASS COMMUNICATION MEDIA' USING CULTURAL CENTERS IN ACCRA AND  
KUMASI. SPECIAL EFFORTS ARE MADE TO TARGET PROGRAMMING  
ON GHANA'S HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL ELITE.

(3) THERE ARE PRESENTLY NO SPECIFIC ISSUES REQUIRING  
AN EARLY WASHINGTON ACTION AND WHICH HAVE  
NOT BEEN DEALT WITH IN PREVIOUS CABLE TRAFFIC.  
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## Message Attributes

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